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Abstract—Tunnel establishment, like HTTPS tunnel or re-
lated ones, between a computer protected by a security gate-
way and a remote server located outside the protected net-
work is the most effective way to bypass the network security
policy. Indeed, a permitted protocol can be used to embed
a forbidden one until the remote server. Therefore, if the re-
sulting information flow is ciphered, security standard tools
such as application level gateways (ALG), firewalls, intrusion
detection system (IDS), do not detect this violation. In this
paper, we describe a statistical analysis of ciphered flows that
allows detection of the carried inner protocol. Regarding the
deployed security policy, this technology could be added in
security tools to detect forbidden protocols usages. In the
defence domain, this technology could help preventing infor-
mation leaks through side channels. At the end of this article,
we present a tunnel detection tool architecture and the results
obtained with our approach on a public database containing
real data flows.
Keywords—cyberdefense, network security, decision trees, hid-
den Markov models, HTTPS tunnel, RandomForest.
1. Introduction
Controlling flows going through network boundaries is
a key point of information systems security. The filtering of
these flows and the verification of their conformance to the
network security policy is done in security gateways by ap-
plication level gateways (ALG) and firewalls. In particular,
these tools enforce the restrictions on forbidden protocols
over the network. This task is achieved by packets filtering
techniques and deep inspection of carried payloads.
Nonetheless, firewalls and ALG may become completely
ineffective in two cases: if a permitted protocol is used to
embed a forbidden one or if the flow is ciphered. This en-
Fig. 1. High level scheme of a TLS tunnel.
ables a legitimate or malicious user to infringe the security
policy of an information network, using covert application-
layer tunnels to bypass security gateways (Fig. 1).
Tunneling tools such as HTTPHost [1] or STunnel [2] are
easily available on the Internet, and may be used by a le-
gitimate user to establish a forbidden connection with an
external Internet server. These connections consist in a pro-
tocol usually filtered by the gateway (e.g., ICQ, FTP, SSH,
Skype, Gnutella, BitTorrent, etc.) embedded in a hyper-
text transfer protocol (HTTP) or hypertext transfer protocol
secure (HTTPS) connection. The resulting data exchange
is not controlled by the security gateway and may lead to
critical information leaks or malware intrusions. For exam-
ple, an invited participant to a meeting on a military vessel
may use a hidden tunnel to leak out classified information
via a VoIP protocol. Moreover, similar hidden tunnels are
used by attackers on the Internet to communicate with local
hosts that have previously been infected by a backdoor.
In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem based
on machine learning techniques. Our system relies on a sta-
tistical analysis of ciphered flows enabling identification
of the carried inner protocol, and therefore, detection of
tunneling activities. This solution consists in computing
features for each flow and comparing these parameters to
a statistical model previously built. The parameters used
are derived from the size and the inter-arrival delays of the
packets in the flow.
2. Related Work
Many flow level classifiers have been presented in former
works and applied to protocol identification [3], [4], [5], [6].
These studies use different parameters and machine learn-
ing techniques (Bayesian methods, support vector machine,
etc.) to classify the flows into several categories (SSH,
HTTP, P2P, GAMES, etc.), with promising results. How-
ever, none of these studies specifically address the security
issues. Therefore, they use parameters easily tampered with
by an attacker, such as port numbers or transmission control
protocol (TCP) flags.
To our knowledge, the methods presented in [7] and [8] are
the only ones that share our goal to classify encrypted or
encapsulated traffic. Nonetheless, both of these works use
only the first packets of a connection to classify the entire
flow. Thus, by simulating a legitimate flow using only the
first packets, an attacker can easily bypass these systems.
Considering the security approach specifically, i.e., tun-
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nels detection, we describe a classification method based
on a decision trees forest. This method leads to better
results than other machine learning algorithms. A study
dealing with the impact of transport layer security (TLS)
encapsulation on flows features used for classification is
also presented. Then, we present a tunnel detection tool
architecture and the classification results obtained with our
approach. Finally, we propose a means to decrease the false
positive rate.
3. Machine Learning Techniques
Applied to Tunnel Detection
Many different machine learning tools have been applied
to the flow classification problem. A machine learning al-
gorithm is used to classify a vector among several pre-
determined classes. It consists in two phases:
• A learning phase, taking as input a set of vectors for
each class and returning a classifying model. During
this phase, the class of each vector is known.
• A challenge phase taking as input a set of vectors,
each belonging to a hidden class, the model and re-
turning the class of each vector.
In our case, the classes are the protocols (HTTP, etc.), and
the vectors are the flows (TCP, etc.) over the gateway.
However, related studies were conducted on different
databases, with different parameters, and results cannot be
compared from one paper to another. An interesting quali-
tative survey of several methods is presented in [6], but no
quantitative comparison is carried out.
In order to determine the most effective algorithm and
the best parameters to use for classification, we con-
ducted several experiments on a public database described
in [9] and [10]. This database is composed of more than
20,000 flows captured on a real network. The distribution
of the database flows by traffic classes are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1
Distribution of the database flows by traffic classes
HTTP
Mail
FTP Attack Peer-
Multimedia Services Inter-
(POP, (WMplayer, (X11, active
SMTP, ...) to-peer real DNS (SSH,
IMAP player, ...) NTP, ...) Telnet)
5707 3519 3107 1822 5717 649 2150 283
First, we selected the parameters that will be used to build
statistical models. In order to classify the ciphered or en-
capsulated flows, these parameters must not be related to
the packets payload. We thus kept only the parameters cal-
culated from the sizes of exchanged packets and the inter-
packets delays. In order to select the most discriminating
ones, a correlation based feature selection with BestFirst
search was applied, as described in [11]. A subset of 10 pa-
rameters was determined by this means:
– the number of transmitted packets, client to server
direction,
– the number of transmitted bytes, client to server di-
rection,
– the IP packets mean size, client to server direction,
– the IP packets maximum size, client to server direc-
tion,
– the minimum inter-arrival delay between two IP pack-
ets, client to server direction,
– the maximum inter-arrival delay between two IP
packets, client to server direction,
– the number of transmitted bytes, server to client di-
rection,
– the maximum IP packets size, server to client direc-
tion,
– the variance of the IP packets size, server to client
direction,
– the number of uploaded bytes/total number of ex-
changed bytes’ ratio.
Afterwards, we applied six different machine learning al-
gorithms to the database, using a cross-correlation method
to classify the entire database. These methods are: support
vector machine (SVM), Gaussian mixture model (GMM),
K-Means, nai¨ve Bayes method, C4.5 decision tree and Ran-
domForest (a forest of random decision trees). For each al-
gorithm, several criterions were evaluated, such as correct
classification rate, false positive rate, computation time, etc.
Figure 2 shows the correct classification rates obtained for
each algorithm.
Fig. 2. Correct classification rates for tested machine learning
algorithms.
It appears that RandomForest, a machine learning tool never
applied before to flow classification, leads to the best per-
formances in terms of correct classification rate and com-
putation time.
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4. Impact of TLS Encryption on
Classification Parameters
Previous experiments were carried out on a database made
of clear flows. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available
payload trace set composed of ciphered flows. Our work
aims at demonstrating the feasibility of tunnel detection
for ciphered flows, and thus it is necessary to prove that
results similar to those mentioned above would be obtained
on ciphered flows. We conducted a complementary study
to evaluate the impact of encapsulation on classification
parameters. In particular, we studied the effect of TLS
encryption on the set of 10 parameters we use to classify
a flow (note that TLS encryption is used to establish an
HTTPs tunnel) following these steps:
– pairs of clear/ciphered flows and extracted are gener-
ated for different protocols (HTTP, SCP, SSH, etc.),
– the classification features are extracted for each flow,
– an affine transformation function from clear to ci-
phered was estimated for each parameter,
– the accuracy of these transformation functions was
estimated by calculating the residual quadratic error
of approximation.
The results obtained showed that the transformation in-
duced by TLS encryption on classification parameters can
be correctly approximated by affine functions for 8 features
out of 10. On the opposite, two of them (minimum inter-
arrival delays between packets from client to server and
variance of the size of packets from server to client) were
transformed in a more complex way.
We can reasonably conclude from this results that TLS
encryption will not lead to a significant loss of performance
for the classification algorithm mentioned above.
5. A Tunnel Detection Tool
Architecture
The biggest drawback of statistical methods is their high
rate of false positive (i.e., legitimate flows classified as ma-
licious). We propose a specific tunnel detection tool archi-
tecture designed to lower the false positive rate. Figure 3
describes this architecture.
The system consists in a network capture tool (such as
TCPDump [12]) combined with a flow demultiplexer. Clas-
sification features are then extracted from each flow, and
a RandomForest model is used to determine the class of
each connection. In order to minimize false positive cases
due to errors of classification, a set of heuristic rules is
applied to generate an analysis report composed of a list of
alerts. These rules take into account past results of clas-
sification, and a level of confidence for each classification.
No alert is raised if the confidence level is too low, if the
IP address of the local or remote host is on a white list, etc.
Fig. 3. High level tunnel detection tool architecture.
The analysis report generated by the application of this set
of rules could have the syslog format, for future integration
in a complex intrusion detection system.
The proposed architecture was implemented on an experi-
mental platform and give very encouraging qualitative re-
sults. These results are presented in the next section.
6. Qualitative Results of the Proposed
Solution
6.1. Network Simulation
At first, we implemented our detection tool on a network
simulator. The simulator consisted in 3 machines, simu-
lating respectively the local network, the gateway and the
Internet. This simulator has been used to measure the TLS
impact (Section 4) and the efficiency of the detection tool.
The resulting detection rates for the protocols shown in Ta-
ble 2 are close to 100%. However, this did not provide
a convincing proof because the diversity of the flows is
reduced compared to a real network:
– the topology of the network is too simple,
– the behavior of the user is unique,
– the material is also unique (one OS, one hardware,
etc.).
Table 2
Distribution of the database flows according
to the protocols
HTTP HTTPs SSH SMTP
DNS
FTP
Active
POP3s NetSteward(over
directory
TCP)
2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 1069 1503 1611
The results obtained for the TLS impact remain valid, but in
order to evaluate the accuracy of the tool, a more complex
set of flows had to be tested.
6.2. A Flows Database in Order to Evaluate Our
Detection Tool
The public database containing real data flows used for
our experimentations is provided by the MAWI working
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Table 3
Confusion matrix obtained using the RandomForest method to classify the database
HTTP HTTPs SSH SMTP DNS FTP
Active
POP3s NetSteward Protocols
directory
93.08 4.36 0.0 1.08 0.04 0.24 0.08 0.36 0.76 HTTP
2.36 91.56 0.08 3.2 0.0 0.48 0.48 2.36 0.28 HTTPs
0.0 0.12 99.44 0.08 0.0 0.08 0.0 0.28 0.0 SSH
0.96 2.28 0.0 91.12 0.2 3.48 1.12 0.72 0.12 SMTP
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.32 99.64 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 DNS
0.08 0.6 0.0 3.0 0.0 95.88 0.2 0.24 0.0 FTP
0.19 0.09 0.0 0.47 0.0 0.0 99.16 0.0 0.09 Active directory
0.13 1.2 0.27 0.73 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.67 0.0 POP3s
1.37 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.57 NetSteward
group [13]. The database is a recording of the whole set
of flows carried by a transpacific 150 Mbit/s network line
between Japan and USA, during 96 hours. The payloads
have been removed and the headers from layers 1 to 4 from
the OSI model have been anonymised.
In order to illustrate the performance of our solution, we
classified nine kind of network flows. For each protocol,
the number of flows contained in the database and used for
the experimentation is shown in the Table 2.
Note that the flows used for the experimentation are
mostly clear flows, i.e., unciphered flows. Indeed, there
is unfortunately no public database of ciphered flows pre-
cising for each flow which protocol is ciphered. Nev-
ertheless, our analysis with this database is interesting
and can be extended to ciphered flows for the following
reasons:
– the flow classification features can be calculated with
ciphered flows exactly as for the clear flows,
– the impact of ciphering on the parameters is limited.
Parameters like the delay induced by the user behavior (as
the password capture for a secure shell (SSH) session or the
frequency of HTTP request while surfing) are not affected
by the encryption.
6.3. Classification Results
Table 3 shows the corresponding confusion matrix obtained
with this algorithm. The procedure used to get the confu-
sion matrix is:
1. For each flow, compute the features regarding the full
connection.
2. Train the classifying model (i.e., RandomForest) on
a subset (the learning set) of flows.
3. Challenge the model on the remaining vectors (the
challenge set.
4. Report the results.
For example in this table:
– the number 93.08 in the first row indicates that
93.08% of HTTP flows have been correctly classi-
fied as HTTP,
– the number 4.36 in the first row indicates that 4.36%
of HTTP flows have been erroneously classified
as HTTPs.
Therefore, the correct classification rates are on the ta-
ble’s diagonal. The average rate of correct classification
is 95.81%.
In a standard configuration, the only allowed protocol
might be HTTP and HTTPs. Any flow classified in an
other class (e.g., SSH, POP3, . . . ) would then be con-
sidered as malicious. Hence, if we set this configuration,
the tool detects 98.68% of illegitimate flows (corresponding
to 1.32% of false negatives) with 4.72% of false positives
(i.e., false alarms). This last rate is too high for an actual
use, since most of flows are legitimate. In Subsection 6.7
we propose a way to decrease the number of false alarms
sent by the tunnel detection tool.
6.4. Classification Computation Time
As shown in Table 4, the classification computation time
is quite short. The implementation has been realized on
a 3.06 GHz PC platform running under a Debian distribu-
tion. The langage used is Java, therefore this computation
time could be reduced using a faster langage such as C if
needed.
Table 4
Computation time with a 2500 flows database
Phase Time
Learning phase 1143 ms
Challenge phase 223 µs
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6.5. Impact of the Flows Length
The procedure described in Subsection 6.3 works with
a full connection. Thus, it does not allow the gateway
to take a real time decision such as ending a session as
soon as an illegitimate flow is detected (the decision is
a posteriori). In order to take a proactive decision, a small
number of packets can be used rather than the full con-
nection. As a consequence, it increases dramatically the
computation power required by the security gateway. Our
study showed that the decision can be taken with only very
few packets (about 3 packets). This could be explained by
the fact that the considered protocols have different behav-
iors from the beginning of the connection, which helps to
distinguish them with a small number of packets.
6.6. Impact of the Database Size
Another issue is the size of the learning database. Depend-
ing on the context, it may be hard to generate a large
database for each flow. For example, the database built
with our simulator had to be manually filled. Figure 4 il-
lustrates the impact of the database size on the detection
accuracy.
Fig. 4. Impact of the database size on the detection accuracy.
6.7. A Simple Method to Lower the False
Positive Rate
We saw in Subsection 6.7 that the false positives rate
(i.e., legitimate flows classified as malicious) is too high
for an actual use while the illegitimate flows rate is, on the
opposite, very good. Depending on the use case, it could
be better to limit the number of false positives, because it
could disturb most of the network users.
For this reason, we propose to set a confidence indica-
tor. Therefore, a flow with a confidence indicator below
a specific threshold will be automatically considered as le-
gitimate. This rule can be added in the heuristic part of the
tunnel detection tool architecture (Fig. 3).
Figure 5 shows the rates of false positives and false neg-
atives obtained by applying this simple heuristic, based
on the confidence indicator set. We can see that such
a rule can reduce the false positives rate. However, this
method seems too ’naive’, because the increase of false
negatives rate (i.e., illegitimate flows allowed by the se-
Fig. 5. Impact of a rule based on a confidence indicator on the
rates of false positives and false negatives.
curity gateway) is significantly faster than the decrease of
false positives rate.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a solution to the key problem
of encapsulated illegitimate flows detection across network
boundaries. In a first part, we compared the performances
of different machine learning algorithms and identified the
best one in our specific case. In a second part, we con-
ducted a complementary study showing that the effect of
TLS encryption on classification features should not signif-
icantly affect classification performances. Finally, in a last
part, we described a high-level tunnel detection tool archi-
tecture. We pointed out qualitative results using this tool
with a public database and the impact of variation around
the protocol on its accuracy. Finally we proposed, regard-
ing the results obtained, a simple method to lower the false
positive rate.
The construction of our solution is generic and can be tuned
to be used for automatic classification, pro-active reaction
or small learning database. In a global cyberdefense sys-
tem, the proposed architecture could be efficiently used with
a classical security tool, such as an IDS, in order to improve
the security level.
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